Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1990

Layton City v. Frank R. Aragon : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Larry Long; Craig S. Cook; Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant.
Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Layton City v. Aragon, No. 900247 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2637

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPSM-S
BRIEF
UT'
D:
H J

... IT

&

q 002M3'trir
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DOoi\E» NO.
LAYTON CITY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Case No. 900247-CA
Priority No. 2

vs,
FRANK R. ARAGON,
Defendant-Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from a Jury Verdict
in the Second Circuit Court
State of Utah, County of Davis, Layton Department
Honorable K. Roger Bean, Presiding

LARRY LONG
39 Exchange Place, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
PAUL VAN DAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

CRAIG S. COOK
3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

Attorney for PlaintiffAppellee

Attorneys for DefendantAppellant

r

NOV 191990

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LAYTON CITY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Case No, 900247-CA
Priority No, 2

vs ,
FRANK R. ARAGON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from a Jury Verdict
in the Second Circuit Court
State of Utah, County of Davis, Layton Department
Honorable K. Roger Bean, Presiding

LARRY LONG
39 Exchange Place, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
PAUL VAN DAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

CRAIG S, COOK
3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

Attorney for PlaintiffAppellee

Attorneys for DefendantAppellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT

1

ISSUES OF APPEAL

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

2

NATURE OF THE CASE

2

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

10

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
DURING THE TRIAL THE STATEMENTS OF DEFENDANT
MADE TO THE ARRESTING OFFICERS WHILE RESTRAINED
IN A POLICE VEHICLE
A.

11

Because Defendant Was Not Given the
Miranda Warning as Required by the United
State Supreme Court His Right of Federal
and State Self-incrimination Was Violated
and any Statements Were Inadmissible at
His Trial.

18

As a Separate and Alternative Ground,
the Lower Court Should Not Have Admitted
the Statement of the Defendant or Should
Have Granted a Motion to Strike Such
Statement Since the Prosecutor Did Not
Prove the Corpus Delicti of the DUI
Offense Absent the Defendant's Statements.

27

POINT II. WITHOUT THE ADMISSIONS BY THE
DEFENDANT AS TO HIS DRIVING OF THE AUTOMOBILE
AND THE TIME THE AUTOMOBILE WAS DRIVEN, THE
STATE PRODUCED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ALLOW
THE MATTER TO GO TO THE JURY ON CHARGES OF
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE AND THE LOWER COURT
SHOULD THEREFORE HAVE DISMISSED THIS CHARGE
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT

32

B.

CONCLUSION
ADDENDUM

36

CASES CITED
Berkemer v. McCarthy,
468 U.S. 420 (1984)

20, 21

Brown v. State,
405 S.E.2d 785 (Ga. 1958)

28

California v. Behler,
463 U.S. 1121 (1983)

20

Commonwealth v. D'Nicuola,
292 A.2d 333 (1972)

25

Commonwealth v. Meyer,
412 A.2d 517 (Tenn. 1980)

24

Dearden v. State,
430 P.2d 844 (Okla. App. 1967)

36

Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966)

9, 10, 18, 20, 21, 22
23, 24, 25, 26, 32

Pearce v. Wistisen,
701 P.2d 489 (Utah 1985)

2

Ostler v. Albinia Transfer Co., Inc.,
781 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1989)

2

Overbee v. Commonwealth,
315 S.E.2d 242 (Va. 1984)

36

Richfield City v. Walker,
131 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (Utah Adv. 1990)

33

Schram v. District of Columbia,
485 A.2d 623 (D.C. App. 1984)

36

State v. Anderson,
561 P.2d 240 (Utah 1977)

2, 27

State v. Booker,
709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985)

2

State v. Chapman,
724 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. App. 1987)
State v. Erwin,
120 P.2d 285 (Utah 1941)

22, 35
27

538 (Mo. App. 1987)

30, 35

2 (Wash. App. 1978)

27, 31

J (Vt. 1983)

25

5 (Utah 1977)

27

1 (La. 1978)

35

3 (Utah 1983)

2

?~8 (La. App. 1984)

35

7 (La. App. 1984)

34

•/. Rep. 12 (Utah App. 1990)

1, 20, 37

3 (Utah 1957)

27

i

23

(Or. App. 1982)
(La. App. 1988)

34

STATUTES CITED
ced States Constitution

2

on 12, Utah State Constitution

2

Utah Code Annotated

1

les of Criminal Procedure

5

OTHER AUTHORITIES
e of Drunk Driving Cases,
pp. 1-23-24 (3d Ed. 1990)

28, 30

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LAYTON CITY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs .

Case No. 900247-CA
Priority No. 2

FRANK R. ARAGON,
Defendant-Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
This Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment entered
in the Second Circuit Court in accordance with Section
78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated,
ISSUES OF APPEAL
1.

Did the Circuit Court err in failing to suppress the

verbal statement of Defendant obtained by Layton City police
officers and in admitting such statement into evidence during the
jury trial.

The standard for review as to this issue is whether

the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right of
self-incrimination as to the claim that a Miranda warning was not
given to him and this Court does not accord any particular
deference to the trial court's conclusions but rather reviews
them for correctness.
14 (Utah App.

State v. Sampson, 143 Utah Adv.

Rep.

12,

1990) . As a second ground for wrongfully

admitting the statement of Defendant did the lower court abuse
its discretion in admitting such statement when the state had
failed to establish independent evidence of the corpus delicti of
-1-

driving while under the influence?

State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d

240 (Utah 1977); Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah
1985); Ostler v. Albinia Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d 445, 447
(Utah App.
2.

1989) .

Excluding the wrongfully admitted statement of the

defendant, was there sufficient evidence presented by the
prosecutor to sustain the conviction for driving under the
influence.

The standard of review for this issue is whether

there is sufficient evidence from which findings of all the
requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made.

State v.

Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985); State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443
(Utah 1983).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.

Amendment 5 to the United

States Constitution.
In criminal prosecutions . . . the accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself.

Article 1, Section

12, Utah State Constitution.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction of Defendant in
the Second Circuit Court, Layton Department, for the offense of
driving while intoxicated.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On February 7, 1990 an information was filed by the City of
Layton against defendant Frank Aragon charging him with driving
-2-

under the influence of alcohol, delaying and obstructing an
officer, and disorderly conduct.

[Note: For some unexplained

reason there are two separate pleading files which have been
docketed with the Clerk of this Court. Defendant's counsel does
not understand the necessity of these two files since they are
basically in duplicate.

The order of the various documents,

however, is different and some files contain documents that are
not contained in the other.

Since it will occasionally be

necessary to refer to both files during this brief Appellant will
designate the file dated May 21, 1990 as File No. I and the file
dated August 20, 1990 as File No. II.].
On August 28, 1989 Defendant moved to dismiss the charges
filed against him on the basis there was no evidence legally
sufficient to entitle prosecution and to suppress evidence.
(R.I., 17) On September 28, 1989 a hearing was held before the
Honorable K. Roger Bean for the purpose of determining
Defendant's motion to suppress evidence.

(R.I., 121; 101-111).

The lower court denied Defendant's motion on October 27, 1989.
(R.I., 95-96; see "Memorandum of Decision" contained in Addendum
to this Brief).
On January 9, 1990 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider
the previous ruling on Defendant's motion to dismiss based upon a
decision of the Honorable John A.

Rokich, Third District Judge,

in an appeal from the Department of Motor Vehicles determination
that Defendant would lose his license for failing to submit to a
blood alcohol test.

Judge Rokich reversed the determination of

the Department and found that the officers had no probable cause
-3-

to arrest the petitioner for driving under the influence at the
time the arrest was made.

(R.I., 91, 89-90; see "Memorandum of

Decision", Araqon v. Schwendiman contained in the Addendum to
this Brief).

The lower court on February 7, 1990 denied

Defendant's motion to reconsider.

(R.I., 84; see "Memorandum of

Decision" dated February 7, 1990 in the Addendum to this Brief).
A jury trial was held on February 8 and February 9, 1990
before the Honorable K. Roger Bean.

At the conclusion of the

City's case Defendant moved to dismiss.
The lower court denied these motions.

(Trial Trans., 182-37).
(Trial Trans., 188). The

following day defense counsel presented arguments in support of
his previous motion to strike any testimony of the defendant that
had been elicited from the officers making the arrest.
took this motion under advisement.
ruled upon.

The Court

(R.I., 199). It was never

A verdict was returned by the jury finding Defendant

guilty of driving while under the influence of alcohol, guilty of
delaying and obstructing an officer, and guilty of disorderly
conduct.

(R.I., 12). On April 16, 1990 Defendant was sentenced

to four days in jail, fined $750 and placed on probation for
twelve months.
of Appeal.

(R.I., 10). On May 16 Defendant filed his Notice

(R.II., 26). This appeal is taken only from the DUI

conviction.
On June 19, 1990 Defendant filed an application for a
Certificate of Probable Cause and Stay requesting the lower court
to prevent Defendant's license from being suspended during the
pendency of an appeal to this Court on the basis that the
suspension of the license would most probably be completed before
-4-

this Court could review the conviction.

The lower court denied a

stay on the basis that it had no jurisdiction over the driver's
license division and that such effort would have to be made in
the District Court or the Court of Appeals.

(R.II., 14-15).

On July 17, 1990 Defendant filed a petition for stay of
execution pursuant to Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure before this Court.

(R.II., 9-13).

remanded to the lower court for consideration.
the district court denied the stay.

The matter was
After a hearing,

(R.II., 8 ) . This Court

subsequently issued an opinion that it would not decide the stay
issue.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The basic facts in this case are essentially undisputed.
One or more of the arresting officers testified in four separate
proceedings related to the incident occurring on April 2, 1989.
These proceedings included a driver's license revocation hearing
before the Department of Motor Vehicles, a trial de. novo before
the Honorable Third District Judge John Rokich in an appeal from
the Department of Motor Vehicle decision, a hearing concerning
Defendant's motion to dismiss in the Second Circuit Court, and a
jury trial in the Second Circuit Court.

For purposes of this

appeal the most complete factual scenario of what occurred on
April 2, 1989 is contained in the September 28, 1989 suppression
hearing transcript.

As will be noted later in this brief certain

portions of the evidence that was given during the suppression
hearing was not introduced during the jury trial because of
hearsay objections.

These exclusions will be noted in detail
-5-

infra as it relates to the jury trial and the evidence upon which
Defendant was convicted.

However, for purposes of this Brief the

suppression hearing will be principally utilized as a basis for
the statement of facts.
At approximately 1:40 in the morning three Layton City
officers were dispatched to an address within Layton City on the
basis that a family fight was in progress.

(Suppression Hearing

transcript, p. 10; hereinafter SH). As the officers arrived they
observed a male and female standing in a driveway next to a car
which was running and which had its lights on.

The man was

standing next to the car on the right-hand passenger side.
11).

A male and a female officer approached the couple who at

that time did not appear to be having any kind of dispute.
12).

(SH,

(SH,

The female officer began talking to the woman and the male

officer began talking to the man who was the defendant Frank
Aragon.
The conversation between the male officer and Defendant
became aggitated.

The male officer, John Lynch, stated that as

soon as he began talking to Defendant he could smell alcohol and
that he noticed Defendant had glassy eyes.

(SH, 59). While the

officer was questioning Defendant, the officer testified that the
defendant became irritated and started to approach him.

The

officer stated that he pushed him back at which time Defendant
doubled up his fist and made threatening comments.

(SH, 60). As

the confrontation increased the third officer came up from behind
and told Defendant that he was under arrest for disorderly
conduct.

The two officers then wrestled the defendant to the
-6-

ground and handcuffed him.

(SH, 61). The defendant sustained an

injury to his cheek at the time he hit the pavement which was
lightly termed "road burn".

(SH, 41). After the defendant was

restrained he was told that he was being placed under arrest for
disorderly conduct.

(SHf 20, 68).

The officers then took the defendant and placed him in the
back seat of Officer Sharon Beckett's police automobile.
19).

(SH,

At that time he was handcuffed, seatbelted and was

therefore unable to leave the vehicle.

(SH, 19). It is

undisputed that Defendant was not present during any of the
subsequent conversations that the officers had with various
individuals.
Officer Lybbert and Officer Beckett interviewed a woman
named June Trujillo who was present at the house where the car
had been parked.

Ms. Trujillo told the officers that the

defendant had been in the house earlier but that he had been
there with a friend.

She said she did not know who the person

was and that she did not know whose vehicle was in the driveway.
(SH, 24) .
In the meantime, the other officer, John Lynch, talked to
Rose Aragon, Defendant's wife, who was the female standing near
him at the time the officers came to the scene.

Officer Lynch

asked her how the defendant got to the house and she stated he
drove.

(SH, 62). He then talked to a young lady named Nicki

Trujillo who also said that Defendant had driven there.

(Id.).

While this questioning was going on by Officer Lynch, Sgt.
Lybbert and Officer Beckett returned to the police vehicle to
-7-

question the defendant.

At that point Defendant had already been

placed under arrest for disorderly conduct and was sitting
quietly in the back seat of the vehicle.

The officers opened the

left rear door of the vehicle in order to talk with him.
27).

(SH,

Officer Lybbert asked the defendant who his friend was.

(SH, 25). He responded that he was there by himself and that he
had driven there three or four minutes before the police arrived.
(SH, 28-29, 54-55).
During this interview with the defendant Sgt. Lynch was
speaking with June Trujillo.

She told him that the defendant had

come to the house earlier with a friend just as she had
previously told the same story to Sgt. Lybbert.

Officer Lynch

then talked to Sgt. Lybbert who told him that Defendant said
there was no friend which made Officer Lynch assume that Ms.
Trujillo was telling him a story.

He therefore returned to her

and gave her a Miranda warning informing her that if she was
telling him a story she could be charged with obstructing an
investigation.

At that time she said she didn't know anything.

(SH, 63).
Officer Beckett stated that during this period of time that
Defendant was parked in her police vehicle she did not have any
information concerning the ownership of the car.

(SH, 29). It

was not until she returned to the jail and ran a vehicle check
that she discovered that the vehicle parked in the driveway was
registered to the defendant.

(SH, 37).

Since the defendant was already under arrest while sitting
in the back of the vehicle Officer Beckett did not believe that
-8-

she specifcally told him that he was also being placed under
arrest for driving under the influence-

She had been instructed

by Sgt. Lybbert to file the DUI paperwork since she was the only
officer still on shift while at the police station.

It is

undisputed that during the entire period at the arrest site and
in the police vehicle Defendant was never given the Miranda
warning.

(SH, 55).

Several additional facts which were not brought out in the
suppression hearing but were elicited during the trial complete
the factual story.

Officer Lybbert testified that upon searching

the vehicle in the driveway he discovered one full beer can and
one empty can.

(Trial Trans., 117). The car was ultimately

turned off by June Trujillo.

(Trial Trans., 118). Officer

Lybbert further testified that because of the confusing
statements given by the witnesses he did not have any real idea
who drove the automobile to the house until he spoke to Defendant
who verified that he was the driver.

(Trial Trans., 124-130).

Upon arriving at the jail Officer Beckett asked Defendant if
he would submit to a breath test.

Defendant requested to talk to

a lawyer at which time he was informed that the right to counsel
and the right to remain silent does not apply to the implied
consent law and that he would lose his license if he did not take
the test.

(Trial Trans., 164-65).

After Defendant refused to

take the test Officer Beckett gave him the Miranda warning.

When

asked whether he wished to answer any questions he then informed
her that he did not.

(Trial Trans., 166).

Subsequently,

Defendant informed her that he was now willing to submit to a
-9-

blood but not a breath test.

She did not give him a blood test

and subsequently placed him in a cell for the evening,

(Trial

Trans., 167).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The lower court erred in failing to suppress the

statements of Defendant that he was the driver of the automobile
and that he had driven it there at the scene some three or four
minutes before the police arrived.

This statement should not

have been allowed to go to the jury for two reasons.

First, the

statement was made while defendant was handcuffed, seatbelted,
injured and physically restrained in the back of Officer
Beckett's police vehicle.

At no time while he was at the scene

of the incident or in the police vehicle did he receive the
Miranda warning.

Defendant had already been arrested for

disorderly conduct and was basically restrained while the
officers investigated the circumstances.

He was neither given a

Miranda warning for the disorderly conduct charge nor for the
driving under influence charge even though the officers strongly
suspected that he had driven the automobile to the scene in an
intoxicated condition after speaking with several witnesses.
As a second alternative ground for suppressing the statement
of the defendant, the State failed to prove the corpus delicti of
the charge of driving under the influence without the admission
of the defendant.

At trial, the State did not produce any

witnesses who allegedly saw the defendant driving the automobile
or could have testified when the automobile was driven and the
condition of the defendant when he was driving it.
-10-

Without

Defendant's admission that he was the driver and that he had only
been there three or four minutes there is no evidence sufficient
to establish a corpus delicti and therefore the admission should
have been excluded.
2.

When the admission of the defendant is excluded from the

evidence introduced at trial there is simply nothing left for
which a jury could convict the defendant of driving under the
influence.

Taking the evidence most favorably for the State

shows that Defendant was intoxicated while standing next to his
vehicle which had its motor on and its lights on.

Such evidence

is clearly insufficient to confict Defendant of driving while
intoxicated.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
DURING THE TRIAL THE STATEMENTS OF
DEFENDANT MADE TO THE ARRESTING
OFFICERS WHILE RESTRAINED IN A
POLICE VEHICLE.
During the jury trial of this matter Officer John Lybbert
was called as a witness on behalf of the State.
Q.

(By Prosecutor) Okay. You talked to other people
that were there, too, didn't you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. And during that conversation with them, you
discussed the incident as it had occurred?

A.

Yes.

Q.

From that, you made a determination; is that

I did.
And that would be, I guess Rose Aragon?
Rose Aragon, June Trujillo.

I did.

-11-

right?
A.

Yes,

I did.

Q.

What did you determine?

A.

I determined that Mr. Aragon was the driver of the
car when it arrived.

Q.

Okay.
MR. LONG: Your Honor, I would have to move to
strike that answer as being nonresponsive to the
question. I mean, there is no way to object when
he says what conclusion did you make and he comes
out—off the wall with what he came up with.
THE COURT: I agree there is no way to object to
that, but what do you claim as the basis for the
objection?
MR. LONG: Well he is going to the truth of the
matter asserted and he is making a generalization
as to what he came to this conclusion without even
the hearsay evidence to base upon his conclusion.
THE COURT: Well, when
the bench, this is why
a limiting instruction
to whether or not they
MR. LONG:

we had our conference at
I asked you if you wanted
because it is relevant as
had probable cause.

Right.

THE COURT: And of course, he could talk to others
for that purpose, and he could make that
determination for that purpose. Would you—all
right. I deny your motion to strike and to
instruct the jury to disregard, well, to strike;
but I do instruct the jury to disregard for the
purpose—
Members of the Jury, disregard the witness* last
answer relative to the elements of the cause of
action, whether defendant was driving. It's a
preliminary matter, it's been covered already in
motions before the court. It's admissible for a
limited purpose to show that the officer had a
reason, this officer or some other officer at the
scene, had a reason to arrest Mr. Aragon at the
scene, but you should disregard it—that answer
as to whether or not, for purposes of your
determinations, Mr. Aragon was driving this motor
vehicle at this point. You may go ahead.
-12-

MR. STONEY:

Thank you.

(By Mr. Stoney) Now, at some point in your
investigation, you actually came back to the car
where Mr. Aragon had been sitting; is that right?
Yes.

I did.

He was handcuffed, I believe, and seatbelted in
the back seat of that car?
Yes.
Okay.
him?
Yes.

He was.
Was the door open when you were talking to
I opened the door to talk to him.

Okay. And you reached in and you asked him the
question "who was your friend". Is that right?
MR. LONG: I would have to object, Your Honor,
on the ground that this i s —
MR. STONEY: I'll restate the question, Your
Honor. I apologize, counsel.
(By Mr. Stoney)
asked him?

What was the question that you

The question I asked him was, I asked him, "Where
is the other person that was in the car with you,
since I need to talk with him?"
And did he respond to that?
He did.
MR. LONG: I'd have to object to the response,
Your Honor.
THE COURT:

And the ground?

MR. LONG: Well, he's handcuffed in the back of
the police car, he's under arrest and he hasn't
been given the Miranda warning, and they are
interrogating him.
MR. STONEY: Your Honor, if I could remind the
Court that underneath the voluntary exception in
the Miranda warnings, the officer is allowed to
ask a few basic questions. Here in this
-13-

question, the officer had no reason to believe
that there would be an incriminating response
come in. That's why the defendant's response
becomes important, because if that response is
incriminating, it's unresponsive to the question
that he asked. His question is, "Where is your
friend?" It has nothing to do with incriminating
him in the process. The officer here is
impounding a car, he's got a vehicle with him,
he's got—and he is merely asking where the
friend is, so it's completely unresponsive to
what the officer has to say.
MR. LONG:
we know.

But the response is incriminating, as

THE COURT: Well, but what about the fact that
it isn't responsive to the question?
MR. LONG:
question.

Well, it is responsive to the

THE COURT: He's received—testimony so far is
that he's received information somebody else
drove it.
MR. LONG: Well, but it is response to the
question. It's just more encompassing than
the question asked, which is what the last
officer was attempting to do. Answer the
question and then go on and explain some
other things as well, that were not—
THE COURT: Objection is overruled.
go ahead, Mr. Stoney.
MR. STONEY:

You may

Thank you.

Q.

(By Mr. Stoney) Officer, what was the
defendant's answer to the question, and I
believe it was, "where is the other person?"

A.

Mr. Aragon stated to me "there isn't anyone
else with me, I was alone when I drove here."
(Trial Trans., 100-104).

Officer Sharron Beckett who was also present during the
conversation with the defendant also was allowed to testify
concerning this conversation.

The following dialogue occurr

redirect examination by the prosecutor.
-14-

Q.

Prior to the time when the defendant was
wrestled and handcuffed to the ground, he
did make some statements regarding the
actual time that he had arrived, did he not?

A.

Prior to that, I didn't hear a time frame,

Q.

Did you hear him make statements then, at
some point?

A.

Yes-

Q.

Okay. When was that that he made statements
about when he had arrived?

A.

When he was in my patrol car.

Q.

Were they in response to a direct question
or was he just making statements to you?

A.

He was answering a question of Sgt. Lybbert's.

Q.

Which, was that the question that you discussed
yesterday, about whwere was this other person,
or whatever the question was?

A.

It was in regards to where his friend was.

Q.

Un huh, and the answer to that question, we
discussed yesterday, but he also added something to that, did he not, about his time of
arrival?

A.

Yes.

I did.

He did.

MR. LONG: Your Honor, I'd have to object on
grounds of Miranda and corpus delicti of the
crime, and that this relates, his answer
relates directly to an interogation by the
officer.
THE COURT:
continue.
MR. STONEY:

Objection is overruled.

You may

Thank you.

Q.

(By Mr. Stoney) And what was his response about
the time that he had just arrived?

A.

I just got here three or four minutes ago.
(Trial Trans., 230-31).

During the closing argument Mr. Stoney, the prosecutor, made
-15-

the following statement to the jury:
So, the first one, with regard to—and we'll go to
the DUI, first of all, the driving under the influence.
It starts out, number 1, that on or about the second
day of April, 1989, the defendant drove a vehicle, or
was in actual physical control—or excuse me, just
drove a vehicle. I apologize for that last part.
Drove a vehicle.
Now, if he drove a vehicle to that situation, if
you believe that he drove a vehicle, you've heard the
testimony, you've heard his admissions, you've heard
that the vehicle was running, the lights were on, the
officers were there, other people, you've heard the
whole situation; then the prosecution's met that
element. I would suggest to you that the prosecution
has met that element, because there has been no
contradictory evidence whatsoever to that. (Trial
Trans., 247) .
On rebuttal during the argument to the jury the prosecutor
made the following remarks:
Really, what it comes back to is the facts. They
arrive at the scene, there's a car there, running,
there's lights on. There is an argument going on. An
officer approaches and Aragon starts in. That's what
occurred with respect to it.
Was he driving? Well he admitted to driving.
Now, I guess nobody is calling him a liar. How soon
was he driving? Three to four minutes before the
officers got there. Three to four minutes, that's what
he said. I was driving. Nobody's accusing him of
lying. He was driving. There isn't any question about
that, there's no evidence to tell you that he wasn't
driving. (Trial Trans., 269).
Although the information filed in this case originally
charged Defendant with two separate offenses; i.e., driving while
intoxicated and having actual physical control of a vehicle while
intoxicated.

(R.I, 125). The prosecutor and the court

subsequently agreed that actual physical control was not an issue
in the case and that only driving was relevant.

(Trial Trans.,

209; R.I, 16, 20). Thus, in order for Defendant to be convicted
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of driving under the influence it was necessary as stated in the
jury instructions to find "beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the
following elements of that offense: (1) that on or about the
second day of April, 1989 Defendant drove a vehicle and (2) that
at the time Defendant was under the influence of alcohol to a
degree which rendered him incapable of safely driving a vehicle."
(R.I, 20).
For purposes of this appeal, Defendant will concede that
there was sufficient evidence in the opinion of the arresting
officers that Defendant was intoxicated and was incapable of
operating a vehicle.

The sole issue of this appeal was whether

there was sufficient evidence to show that the defendant was
driving a vehicle at the time of such intoxication.

As such,

therefore, the statements made by the defendant were critical to
establishing this element of the offense and it was prejudicial
error to admit such statements for two distinct and separate
reasons.
First, the statements given to the officers occurred at a
time when Defendant was clearly in custody after having been
arrested on disorderly conduct and at a time when a Miranda
warning should have preceded any questioning of the defendant.
Since no Miranda warning was given until much later at the police
station any statement made by the defendant was inadmissible.
Second, at trial the prosecutor failed to establish by
independent competent evidence that Defendant had driven the
vehicle while intoxicated and the admission by Defendant is
insufficient to establish the corpus delicti of a crime without
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other competent corroborating evidence.

Here there was none.

These two reasons for excluding Defendant's statements will
now be addressed.
A.

Because Defendant Was Not Given the
Miranda Warning as Required by the United
States Supreme Court His Right of Federal
and State Self-incrimination Was Violated
and any Statements Were Inadmissible at
His Trial.

During the suppression hearing the lower court and defense
attorney discussed the concept of requiring a Miranda warning in
this case.

The Court's subsequent denial of Defendant's motion

for suppression was based upon this dialogue.

The following

statements occurred:
THE COURT: All right. You're not taking the
position, I gather, that once a person is
arrested for one offense, that they couldn't
then arrest for another?
MR. LONG:
THE COURT:
MR. LONG:

No, if they had probable cause—
All right.
— a t the time of the arrest.

THE COURT: Well, they could investigate while
that person is under arrest, the fact that that
person may have committed another offense. The
prosecution would have the right to do that,
wouldn't they?
MR. LONG:

Without Miranda warnings?

THE COURT: Well, investigate, yes. Without
Miranda warnings, unless the nature of the
investigation is such that it does require
Miranda warnings.
MR. LONG: Well, I think absolutely it requires
the Miranda warnings.
THE COURT: Well, it does, if they are going to
interrogate in a custodial situation under the
kinds of circumstances Miranda dictates.
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MR, LONG: Well, I don't see how much more
custodial you can get than to have handcuffs on
and sitting in the back of a police car.
THE COURT: Well, you can get more custodial,
Miranda talks about it. You can be isolated
for a period of time from outside contact, you
can be—feel that you are cut off from the world
and so forth. He's sitting in the back seat of
a car, his wife standing not far from there, I
guess, and—but I'm not—you know—I'm not
prepared to debate that at this time; but I'm
just saying so far—you're not taking the
position that they could not go ahead and
investigate, aside from asking him questions
without giving the Miranda warning, they could
do any other kind of investigation they wanted,
couldn't they?
MR. LONG: Well, in this particular case, she
had no information at that time.
THE COURT: Well, my question isn't that.
question is, could they investigate?

My

MR. LONG: Well, I would respond by—by quoting
the language from the earner case in 1983,
which is still the law in Utah. An accused must
be apprised of his Miranda rights if the setting
is custodial rather than investigatory. In other
words, at the point environment become custodial
or accusatory, all police questions must be
prefaced with Miranda warnings.
THE COURT: Well, but aren't you between a rock
and a hard place a little bit here? His custody
is not related to the offense they are doing an
investigation on; his custody is for disorderly
conduct.
MR. LONG: So, if someone is being interrogated
after being placed under arrest for being the
Boston Strangler and he confesses to other
crimes, that's all right?
THE COURT: Yeh, if they're not, they're
interrogating him and under the intense
interrogation that I think Miranda is directed
to, if he confesses to an improper left turn,
couldn't they charge him on that?
MR. LONG:

Absolutely not.
-19-

I mean, the language

is clear. It says all police questions, that
includes his name, his address, and his social
security number; all police questions. That's
the language of the Supreme Court. (Suppression
Hearing, pp. 72-75).
The lower court committed fundamental error in allowing
these admissions to go before the jury.

In 1966 the United

States Supreme Court in the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S.

436 (1966) held that once a person was subject to

"custodial interrogation" it was required that a police officer
advise him of his constitutional rights including the right to
remain silent before any further interrogation could occur.

The

court defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." Id. at 444.
463 U.S.

Later, in California v. Behler,

1121 (1983) (per curium) the court stated that "the

ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a
formal arrest." Id. at 1125.

In a still later case the U.S.

Supreme Court held that the test of custody is an objective one,
i.e., that "the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in
the suspect position would have understood his situation."
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984).
This Court in the recent case of State v. Sampson, 143
Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Sept. 11, 1990) reviewed the federal and state
cases concerning custodial interrogation.

This Court stated:

The Utah Supreme Court has identified several key
factors to consider in order to determine when a
defendant who has not been formally arrested is in
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custody. They are (1) the site of interrogation; (2)
whether the investigation focused on the accused; (3)
whether the objective indicia of arrest were present;
and (4) the length and form of interrogation. Salt
Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983).
Another factor which we find pertinent to our
analysis was recognized by our Oregon counterpart
in State v. Herrera, 621 P.2d 1209 (Or. App.
1980). That factor is (5) whether the defendant came
to the place of interrogation freely and willingly.
Id. at 1212. 143 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15.
Thus, the law is crystal clear as to the requirement of a
Miranda warning when a person has either been accused of a crime
which results in a custodial interrogation or has in fact been
arrested because he is charged with a crime.

The Supreme Court

in Berkemer, supra, specifically applied the Miranda requirement
to cases involving traffic offenses.

The Court stated " [a person

subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to the benefit
of the procedural safeguards ennunciated in Miranda, regardless
of the nature or severity of the offense of which he is suspected
or for which he is charged."

468 U.S. at 439.

The court in Berkemer specifically applied Miranda
warnings to traffic violations.

It stated, "If a motorist who

has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is
subject to treatment that renders him

in custody* for practical

purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections
prescribed by Miranda.

468 U.S. at 440.

The officers in this case should have given Defendant a
Miranda warning for two separate and distinct reasons.

First, at

the time he was arrested for disorderly conduct the warning
clearly should have been given since he was handcuffed and placed
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into custody.

Second, at the time the investigation on drunk

driving focused upon the accused based upon the questioning of
the other witnesses Defendant should have been given the Miranda
warning before being asked any statements concerning the
circumstances then existing.
The question asked by Officer Lybbert concerning the
defendant's alleged friend was directed to the defendant for the
purpose of learning who had driven the automobile to the
investigation scene based upon the statement of Mrs. Trujillo.
Since it was essential for the officers to learn whether
Defendant had driven the vehicle to the scene in an intoxicated
condition such questioning regardless of how indirect requires
the Miranda warning.

Thus, even if he had not been previously

arrested a Miranda warning would have been required.

In this

case, however, since he was clearly under custodial restraint
there is no question but that the Miranda warning should have
been given before any statements concerning any of the charges
was obtained.
A number of cases from other jurisdictions support
Defendant's contention that these statements should have been
suppressed.

In State v. Chapman, 724 S.W.2d 713 (Mo.

App.

1987) an officer responded to a call that an accident had
occurred on a rural road.

Upon arriving the officer found a

pickup truck had left the road and was twenty feet below in a
creek bed.

At the scene the officer determined that the

defendant was intoxicated and placed him under arrest for driving
while intoxicated.

At no time was he given the Miranda warning.
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Subsequently, he was asked a number of questions and the
defendant established that he had been driving the pickup and
that the accident occurred less than thirty minutes before the
officer arrived at the scene*

The defendant contended that the

trial court erred in admitting the incriminating statements he
made after he was arrested because he had not been given the
Miranda warning.

He raised the objection by a motion to suppress

which was overruled and a similar motion at trial which was again
overruled*

In reversing the conviction the Court of Appeals

stated, "It is held that the defendant's incriminating statements
made after he was arrested and in the absence of a Miranda
warning were inadmissible."

Id. at 715.

In Tate v. Wells, 650 P.2d 117 (Or.

App.

1982) a police

officer noticed that a motorist was basically in a stupor while
stopped at a semiphor.

The officer approached the defendant's

car and smelled alcohol on defendant's breath and asked the
defendant to get out of his automobile and walk in front.

The

officer testified that while he was not absolutely certain that
defendant was under the influence of an intoxicant that the
defendant was not free to leave the scene.

The officer

questioned him about his use of alcohol and defendant answered
several questions about the amount and time that the alcohol
consumption had occurred.

The district court denied defendant's

motion to suppress the oral admissions made to the officer.
The Oregon Court of Appeals stated the following:
The trial court's refusal to suppress defendant's
oral statements and admissions was error. State v.
Roberti, 644 P.2d 1104, 646 P.2d 1341 (Or. 1982)
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[0]nce an officer has decided to arrest a person, it is
necessary to warn the person of his right to remain
silent. There was equivocal testimony in this case
concerning the point at which the officer made that
decision. However, the other historical facts,
including that defendant appeared to the officer to
have been in kind of a "stupor" permit no other
conclusion than that defendant was not free to leave
the scene and was in fact under arrest from the time
the officer saw him walk to the front of his car.
Statements made thereafter should, under Roberti,
have been suppressed. Id. at 118-19.
In Commonwealth v. Meyer, 412 A.2d 517 (Tenn.

1980) a

police officer while making a routine patrol came upon a car
which was resting on a guardrail along the highway.

The

defendant was standing within a few feet of the motor vehicle at
the time of the officer's arrival.

The defendant asked the

officer to call a wrecker to take the car off the guardrail but
the officer did not call a tow truck and instead called another
patrol car to assist him.

The officer told the defendant he

would have to wait at the scene until the state police arrived.
He subsequently asked the defendant to wait in his patrol car.
The officer waited until two state troopers arrived to
investigate.

The officer told the state troopers that he

believed the defendant was under the influence of alcohol.

The

state troopers without administering Miranda warnings addressed
the defendant and asked him what had happened.

The defendant

subsequently gave incriminating statements to the state trooper.
In ordering suppression of defendant's pre-arrest statement
the lower court relied upon a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision
which stated that "Whenever an individual is questioned while in
custody or while the object of an investigation of which he is
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the focus, before any questioning begins the individual must be
given the warnings established in Miranda." Commonwealth v.
D'Nicuola, 292 A.2d 333 (1972) (emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower court's
determination that the state trooper's investigation had
"focused" on defendant before he addressed him and asked "what
happened" and therefore should have been given the Miranda
warning before interrogation.

In addition, since defendant

clearly could not leave the scene of the accident he was held to
be in actual custody or otherwise significantly deprived of his
freedom requiring a Miranda warning to be given.

412 A.2d at

521.
Finally, in State v. Kingsbury, 460 A.2d 452 (Vt.

1983)

a police officer noticed a truck weaving badly and stopped it on
suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol.

After the

stop the defendant was asked to perform several sobriety tests
which he successfully accomplished.

The officer then asked

defendant about the load of lumber and where he had obtained it.
Being suspicious, the officer detained the defendant at the scene
until he could call the owner of a local lumber yard who had
recently been robbed of a load of lumber.

The court held that

any statements made by the defendant prior to his formal arrest
while waiting for the lumber yard owner to appear were not
admissible at trial since the defendant was subject to custodial
interrogation even though he was no longer being held on
suspicion of drunk driving.
The preceding cases amply support Defendant's argument that
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his statements concerning his driving of the vehicle and the time
in which the vehicle was driven should not have been admissible
at trial.

Contrary to the lower court's reasoning, it is

difficult to imagine a situation which would more demand the
giving of the Miranda warning.

Here, Defendant was arrested for

disorderly conduct and placed in handcuffs in the back seat of a
police vehicle.

He was not given the Miranda warning at the time

of this arrest.

Compoundly, while clearly in an extreme

custodial situation, the police officers began questioning him
for the purpose of establishing his involvement with the vehicle
for the purpose of charging him with still another crime.
It is also interesting to note two ancillary facts.

Officer

Lynch gave June Trujillo the Miranda warning even though he did
not make any arrest of her when he believed that she was not
truthfully telling him about the status of the automobile and
Defendant.

Obviously, the warning was being utilized to

communicate to Mrs. Trujillo the seriousness of her statements
and in an attempt to make her tell the officer the truth.

It is

strange that Officer Lynch at the time he arrested the defendant
for disorderly conduct failed to give the same warning to the
defendant.
Second, at the time Defendant was taken to the police
station he was finally given the Miranda warning.

At that point

upon being asked whether he would answer questions of the
officers he replied that he would not.

Clearly, the Miranda

warning impacted his conduct.
For these reasons, therefore, the statement of the defendant
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admitted at trial should have been excluded and it was
prejudicial error to allow such statements to go to the jury for
consideration*
B.

As a Separate and Alternative Ground,
the Lower Court Should Not Have Admitted
the Statement of the Defendant or Should
Have Granted a Motion to Strike Such
Statement Since the Prosecutor Did Not
Prove the Corpus Delicti of the DUI
Offense Absent the Defendant's Statements,

To establish the corpus delicti of a crime the state must
prove, independent of any admissions made by the defendant, that
the crime charged in the information was committed.

State v.

Knofler, 563 P.2d 175 (Utah 1977); State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d
240 (Utah 1977); State v. Erwin, 120 P.2d 285 (Utah 1941).
Moreover, there must be independent, clear and convincing proof
of the corpus delicti.

State v. Weldon, 314 P.2d 353 (Utah

1957) .
The policy behind these rules was stated by the Washington
Court of Appeals in State v. Hamrick, 576 P.2d 912 (Wash.
App. 1978).

The reasoning why confessions and admissions cannot

be used to establish the corpus delicti was stated by the court
as follows:
This limitation on the use of admissions for
purposes of the corpus delicti rule is widely accepted
and is based upon the suspect nature of out-of-court
concessions. Corroboration of the confession is
required as a safeguard against the conviction of
innocent persons through the use of a false confession
of guilt. E. Cleary, McCormick's Handbook of the Law
of Evidence, Chap. 14, Sec. 158 (2d Ed. 1972); R.
Perkins, Criminal Law, Chap. 2, Sec. 1(G) (2d. Ed.
1969); 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 2071 (3d. Ed.
1940). See annotation, 40 A.L.R. 460 (1926).
Extensive safeguards on the use of confessions,
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such as the doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) are a recent development in the law.
In view of the numerous safeguards against unreliable
confessions which have developed since the
corroboration rule, it has been questioned whether the
corroboration rule still serves a useful purpose....
While we have some reservations about the need for the
corpus delicti corroboration rule, such a requirement
"does not seem unwise." E. Cleary, supra at 349.
In many instances the only witness to an encounter
will be the police officer and the party whose
admission is the only evidence that a criminal act
occurred. Under these circumstances, it seems wise to
adhere to the corpus delicti corroboration rule as a
protection against potential police abuses. Id. at
913-14.
"[T]he corpus delicti of the offenses...may...be established
by circumstantial as well as direct evidence...provided it is
sufficient to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that
of the guilt of the accused." Brown v. State, 405 S.E.2d 785 (Ga.
1958).

As noted by one leading treatise, "In other words, it is

not enough that circumstantial evidence only offer a reasonable
basis for believing a defendant to be guilty.

The circumstances

of a case must also exclude every reasonable hypothesis of the
facts except those consistent with a defendant's guilt.
Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases, Sec.
(3d.

Ed.

1.01, pp.

R.
1-23-24

1990).

Applying these principles to the instant case shows the
following.

The prosecution clearly had sufficient evidence at

trial to establish the corpus delicti of disorderly conduct and
obstructing an officer based upon the observations and testimony
of the three Layton City officers.

The jury had sufficient

evidence to conclude that Defendant was in fact intoxicated and
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was acting in a disorderly and obstructing manner.
As to the third charge, however, of driving while
intoxicated there was insufficient evidence.

It was essential

as acknowledged by Officer Beckett that the prosecution prove
both that the defendant was intoxicated and that he was driving
while intoxicated.

In a dialogue between Defendant's attorney

and Officer Beckett the following occurred:
Q.

So, if there had been someone else who was sober
and they said they had driven the car there,
would you have arrested him for driving under
the influence?

A.

Not if they were not intoxicated.

Q.

So, in other words, someone drinking and
driving are the critical elements you need to
put together to charge someone with a crime;
is that right?

A.

Of driving under the influence?

Q.

Un huh.

A.

They would need to be driving and they would
need to be under the influence, yes.

Q.

And they would have to be driving a car while
they were under the influence, wouldnft they?

A.

They would have to have been under the
influence while they were driving or driving
while under the influence.

Q.

And were you ever able to ascertain through any
independent sources, other than Mr. Aragon,
when he arrived?

A.

Not a definite time, no.

Q.

Did anyone establish that, to your knowledge?

A.

Not that I know of.

Q.

So if someone was there who was sober and said
they had driven there, you wouldn't arrest him;
but if there was someone there who had been
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intoxicated you would have arrested them for
drunk driving?
A*

It would have depended on the circumstances,

Q.

Wouldn't you have to know when they drove there
and whether they were intoxicated when they
drove there?

A.

We would have to have had some kind of a time
frame. (Trial Trans., pp. 219-20).

Thus, it is evident that to establish the corpus delicti of
driving under the influence it was necessary for the prosecution
not only to prove that the defendant had driven the car to the
location of his wife but that he had actually been intoxicated at
the time he drove it.

In other words, if he had driven the

automobile to the house and became intoxicated while he was there
he clearly could not be charged with driving while intoxicated.
As noted by Professor Erwin, supra,
If, for example, the defendant is the only victim
of and witness to a one-car collision, the fact that he
was driving at the time of the accident, or intoxicated
when the first witnesses arrived on the scene, or when
he took a chemical test will not suffice to convict
him. Instead, the prosecution must prove by direct or
circumstantial evidence that the defendant's
intoxicated condition occurred at the same time that he
was driving. Otherwise, the evidence would be
insufficient for a conviction for driving while under
the influence since there was no way of knowing when
the accident occurred, when the police arrived, or what
happened between the time of the arrest and the time of
the accident. See, Erwin, supra, Sec. 1.04, p.
1-76. (Emphasis added).
A number of other cases from different jurisdictions support
Defendant's contention.

In State v. Friesen, 725 S.W.2d 638

(Mo. App. 1987) the defendant was driving with a friend when
their pickup truck became stuck in a culvert.

The two men got

out of the truck to assess the situation and five minutes later
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flagged down a highway patrol trooper.

The trooper testified

that when the defendant approached him he stated, "I overshot the
driveway" thereby implying that he had been the driver when it
went into the ditch.

The trooper stated, however, that at no

time did he see the defendant or his friend driving or seated in
the truck.

He then asked the defendant if he had been drinking

and after receiving an affirmative reply arrested him and took
him into custody where a breath analyzer test was given.
The Missouri Court of Appeals noted the following:
The corpus delicti of the offense with which
defendant was charged required that someone operated a
motor vehicle while in an intoxicated or drugged
condition. The record before us establishes that the
defendant was intoxicated but does not show, either by
direct or circumstantial evidence, that he or anyone
else operated the truck while under the influence.
Indeed the only evidence of the corpus delicti is the
defendant's statement to Trooper Townsend "I overshot
the driveway" bringing the facts squarely within the
rule of Kansas City v. Verstraete, 481 S.W.2d 615 (Mo.
App. 1972). [In Verstraete the court held that a
defendant's statement that "he did not think he struck
anything" was inadmissible since there was no other
evidence other than defendant's admission to show that
he had been driving the car.]
In this case, the state's burden of establishing
the corpus delicti was made more difficult by the
presence of Arnold LeFever at the scene. Obviously, he
may have been the driver, but that possibility was not
eliminated by the on-the-scene questioning of LeFever
by either Trooper Townsend or Deputy Buscher. Their
testimony did not show that LeFever was not the
driver.
The corpus delicti cannot be presumed. The state
has the burden to prove the corpus delicti by legal
evidence sufficient to show that the crime charged has
been committed by someone. The state has failed to
meet the burden of proving the corpus delicti in this
case. Id. at 640.
In State v. Hamrick, 576 P.2d 912 (Wash.
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App.

1978) an

investigating officer arrived at an accident scene and found a
pickup truck in a ditch south of a road and a car 200 feet west
of the pickup.
the car.

Both vehicles were damaged and skid marks led to

The officer testified that upon being interrogated the

defendant admitted he had been driving the car even though there
was an occupant in the car at the time.

A second trooper also

testified he had admitted driving the car.
The lower court dismissed the charge because it refused to
admit the admission of the defendant concerning his driving.

The

appellate court affirmed and stated:
Exclusive of defendant's admissions, the state's
evidence establishes only that defendant was present
when the officer arrived at the scene of the accident.
There is no independent evidence of inference
connecting defendant with control of the car. We do
not have the slight evidence necessary to logically and
reasonably deduct that defendant was driving the car.
Because there is not sufficient independent evidence to
allow consideration of defendant's admissions, the
state failed to establish the corpus delicti and the
trial court properly dismissed the matter. Id. at
914.
In summary, while the state proved that defendant was
intoxicated at the scene of the confrontation it did not prove,
absent his admissions, that he was in fact the driver of the car
and that when he did drive the car he was in the same state of
intoxication as he was when the police officers arrived.

Thus,

in addition to excluding the admission under the Miranda rule
the court should have excluded it under the corpus delicti rule.
POINT II
WITHOUT THE ADMISSIONS BY THE DEFENDANT
AS TO HIS DRIVING OF THE AUTOMOBILE AND
THE TIME THE AUTOMOBILE WAS DRIVEN, THE
STATE PRODUCED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
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ALLOW THE MATTER TO GO TO THE JURY ON
CHARGES OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
AND THE LOWER COURT SHOULD THEREFORE HAVE
DISMISSED THIS CHARGE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT•
Defendant was originally charged with operating and being in
actual physical control of a vehicle while intoxicated.

As this

Court recently held in Richfield City v. Walker, 131 Utah Adv.
Rep.

37, 41 (Utah Adv.

1990) statutes similar to this actually

described two distinct offenses namely; operating a motor vehicle
and being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle.

At

trial, the state submitted the case solely upon defendant's
driving of the vehicle.
Assuming that Defendant's admission as to driving and time
is excluded then the record shows there is insufficient evidence
for a conviction.

Absent this testimony the only competent

evidence remaining is the following: (1) the officers observed a
motor vehicle sitting in a driveway with its lights on and the
motor running; (2) the motor vehicle was registered in the name
of Defendant; (3) Defendant was found in an intoxicated condition
several feet away from the vehicle while standing there with his
wife.

The prosecutor failed to produce any evidence which showed

that the defendant had driven the car to the scene, or that if he
did he was in a state of intoxication at that time.

In addition,

there was evidence which created ambiguity such as the fact that
defendant's wife was standing next to the automobile at the time
the officers arrived, that there were several other individuals
immediately near the automobile, and that the automobile was
ultimately turned off by Mrs. Trujillo and that an empty bottle
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of beer and a full bottle of beer were found in the car.
Defendant would refer this Court to State v. Willson, 534
S.2d 55 (La.

App.

1988) as a prime example of insufficiency

established by the state as to an element of the prima facie
case.

In that case, two deputies received a report of an

accident and upon arriving at the scene observed a pickup truck
off the roadway and stuck in the mud.

The officers were informed

by a prior officer who had arrived at the scene earlier that the
truck was owned by the defendant.

The defendant verified he

owned the vehicle and admitted driving the vehicle to the scene
but did not specify when he had last operated it.

Defendant was

not observed operating the vehicle by any of the police officers
nor was he in the vehicle when the initial police officers
arrived.

A half-consumed pint bottle of whiskey was found in the

bed of the truck.

The Court of Appeals of Louisiana dismissed

the prosecution on the basis that no evidence was presented by
the state to suggest how long the vehicle was off the road and to
show that he was intoxicated at the time he drove it.

"The

circumstantial evidence fails to exclude or negate every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence as required by law." Id.

at

58.
In a similar type of case, State v. Rutan, 448 S.2d 267 (La.
App.

1984) the owner of a lounge called police to report an

accident in the lot of his lounge.

An undetermined amount of

time later, the investigating officer discovered the defendant
asleep at the controls of his vehicle.

The vehicle was damaged,

the engine was not operating, and the defendant was admittedly
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intoxicated.

In reversing the conviction, the Court of Appeals

emphasized that the state had presented no evidence to suggest
defendant had actually operated the vehicle.

Furthermore,

because there was no testimony as to how long after the accident
the arrest was made, it might just as well be presumed that
defendant while parked at the lounge never operated the vehicle
while in an intoxicated state.
S.2d 500 (La.

See also, State v. Lindinger, 357

1978); State v. Phinney, 467 S.2d 1188 (La.

App.

1984) .
In State v. Chapman, supra, the Missouri Court of
Appeals after holding that defendant's admissions were improperly
admitted found the evidence insufficient to support the
conviction.

The court stated:

The defendant's ownership of the pickup does not
preclude a reasonable hypothesis that another, perhaps
one of the Bests, had been driving the pickup. The
defendant also points out properly admitted evidence
does not establish the time the pickup was being
driven. The insufficiency of the evidence in this
respect is critically analyzed in State v.
Liebhart, 707 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. App. 1986). For these
reasons, defendant's contention the properly admitted
evidence was insufficient to support the conviction has
merit. cf. State v. Phinney, 460 S.2d 1188 (La.
App. 1984). IcL- at 716.
Similarly, in State v. Friesen, supra, once the
erroneous admission of the defendant had been excluded as
competent evidence the Court of Appeals held that the state had
failed to meet its burden of legally sufficient evidence and
reversed defendant's conviction.

725 S.W.2d at 640.

Thus, there was insufficient evidence available to the jury
for it to conclude pursuant to Jury Instruction 9 that (1) on or
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about the 2nd day of April, 1989 Defendant drove a vehicle and
(2) that at the time Defendant was under the influence of alcohol
to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely driving a
vehicle.

(R.I., 20). While the state, for purposes of this

appeal, proved Defendant was intoxicated it did not prove that he
was driving while intoxicated and therefore he was not guilty of
the offense of "driving a motor vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol." (Jury Instruction 3) (R.I., 16).
Parenthetically, it might be noted that even had the
prosecutor and lower court submitted the matter to the jury on
"actual physical control" under the other provisions of the
statute that the evidence of Defendant's location some two or
three feet from the parked vehicle would also be insufficient to
establish a violation.
(Okla.

App.

(D.C.

App.

(Va.

1984).

See, Dearden v. State, 430 P.2d 844

1967); Schram v. District of Columbia, 485 A.2d 623
1984); and Overbee v. Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d 242

CONCLUSION
The lower court clearly erred in allowing the jury to
consider the statement of the defendant after he had been placed
in custody, handcuffed, and restrained in a police car.

Clearly

established federal constitutional law mandated that he be given
the Miranda warning prior to any statements no matter how
innocent the state now claims such statements may be.

In

addition, a second ground for suppression of these statements is
based upon the corpus delicti rule which again has been
formulated to protect criminal defendants from wrongful police
-36-

interrogation.
As this Court recognized in State v. Sampson, supra, that
while the results in particular cases may be unwelcome, "The
Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule is clearly dictated by the
constitution and is the only possible means of protecting the
value underlying the privilege against self incrimination*" 143
Utah Adv.

Rep, at 18.

The crime of driving under the influence carries a severe
penalty to a convicted defendant by the loss of his driver's
license for a sustained period of time.

Thus, the burden upon

the state to prove all of the necessary elements of this case
must be strictly monitored in order to prevent convictions on
improper inferences or illegally obtained evidence.
For these reasons the conviction of the defendant as to the
driving under the influence of alcohol charge must be vacated.
Respectfully submitted,

/^Larr>^ Long 7

IOAAU. & tn*d/
Craig Sty Cook
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant
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General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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this

day of November, 1990.

U
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ADDENDUM

INDEX
"Memorandum of Decision" dated October 27, 1989
"Memorandum of Decision" in Aragon v. Schwendiman
"Memorandum of Decision" dated February 7, 1990

SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
Davis County, Layton Department
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
LAYTON CITY
Plaintiff,
vs.

No.

892001620

Date

2-7-90

Judge

Bean

FRANK R. ARAGON
Defendant

MATTER:

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER

After argument on the motion, the Court took it under advisement
1. Defendant focuses on "actual physical control" as that
phrase is ordinarily used in DUI cases, but that is not the
basis for the prosecution's claim of probable cause to arrest.
What the prosecution is saying is that there was circumstantial
evidence from which Officer Beckett could reasonably conclude
that defendant had driven to the location where he was found,
and that he was in the same condition when driving as when
observed by the officers.
2. Having reconsidered defendant's motion and the Court's
earlier ruling on it, the Court finds no basis for changing the
prior ruling and therefore reaffirms it.

tjcf 13 \m
Lv, u

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FRANK R. ARAGON,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner,

CIVIL NO. 890903616

vs.
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN,
Director Driver License
Services, State of Utah,
Respondents.

This case was tried on the
The

petitioner

J

day

of

September,

1989,

was present and represented by L. Long, and the

respondent was represented by Richard D. Wyss.
The

Court

heard

the

testimony

of

documentary evidence, read the Memoranda
oral argument.

witnesses,

submitted,

admitted

and

heard

The Court took the matter under advisement.

The Court being fully advised in

the

premises, makes

its

The Court finds that petitioner was placed under arrest

for

ruling.

being

a

disorderly

person, and subsequent thereto for driving

under the influence.
The

arrest

for

driving under the influence was based upon

the police officer's observations of the

petitioner's

conduct,

ARAGON V, SCHWENDIMAN

the

smell

of

PAGE TWO

alcohol

on his breath; and that he was standing

next to a motor vehicle parked
the

motor

running.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The

on

petitioner's

driveway

with

officer had not observed any driving

violation on the part of the petitioner that

could

have

given

the officer cause for stopping the petitioner.
The Court concludes that the arresting officer did not
probable

cause

to

arrest the petitioner for driving under the

influence at the time the arrest was made. The
not

have

officers

could

establish at the time of the arrest that the petitioner was

in actual physical control over the vehicle.
arrest,

the

after the

officer

arrest

may

Subsequent to

the

have obtained sufficient information

to warrant

arresting

petitioner,

but

the

make

the

critical time is at the time of the arrest.
Since the officer did not have probable cause
arrest,

the

petitioner

would

not

to

be required to submit to a

blood/alcohol test; therefore his license should not be

revoked

for failing to submit to an intoxilyzer test.
Dated this

/J± day of October, 1989.

Y<uJL.— A y
ROKICH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

VJOliN A .

v

SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
Davis County, Layton Department
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
LAYTON CITY
Plaintiff,
vs.

No.

892001620

Date

10-27-89

Judge

Bean

FRANK R. ARAGON
Defendant

MATTER:

DECISION ON DEFENDANTS MOTION

The Court took this matter under advisement so that applicable
statutes, court decisions and text authorities could be
reviewed. That having been done, the Court now finds and
concludes:
1. On 5-2-89, defendant filed his motion to dismiss and notice
of hearing. The basis for the dismissal, set forth in the
motion, was that "there is no evidence in the case legally
sufficient to entitle prosecution to a conviction against
defendant herein." It was heard 5-15-89 by Judge Heffernan, and
denied.
2. The clerk set a pretrial, it was continued, and at the later
date defense counsel moved to suppress evidence. However, no
written motion to suppress was filed. Hearing was had and
testimony taken. This judge doesn't know what was argued to
Judge Heffernan, but has proceeded and is proceeding on the
assumption, acquiesced in by counsel, that this is a separate
motion based on different grounds.
3.

The testimony of officers Beckett and Lynch showed that:
a.

The officers were dispatched to a family fight and
given information that Frank Aragon was beating his
wife and was about to leave in a black Monte Carlo.

b.

When officer Lynch arrived at the location,
defendant was standing next to and leaning on a
black Monte Carlo, parked in the driveway. There
were other persons at the location.

c.

The car's lights were on and the engine was running.

2.
d.

Defendant was the registered owner of the car.

e.

Rose Aragon told the officers defendant drove there.

f.

Niki Trujillo told them defendant drove there.

g.

Defendant told them he drove there.

h.

There was an absence of evidence anyone else had
driven the car there.

i.

There was an absence of evidence defendant had
arrived there by any other means.

Utah code sec. 41-6-44(8) says:
A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person
for a violation of this section when the officer has
probable cause to believe the violation has occurred,
although not in his presence, and if the officer has
probable cause to believe that the violation was
committed by the person.
5. At the hearing on the mot ion, defense counsel took the
position that defendant hadn1 t been advised of his rights before
he was asked whether he'd bee n driving the car, and therefore
his answer was not admissible in evidence, and without it the
prosecution could not establi sh the corpus delicti, and
therefore the case should be dismissed. This judge must assume
that is the question passed o n by Judge Heffernan, but if this
judge were to consider it now the motion would be denied,
Under the Utah decisions on c orpus delicti, defendant's
statement would be admissible at trial, but even if it weren't,
Officer Beckett was permitted to consider it to establish
probable cause for an arrest for driving under the influence of
alcohol. 5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest , sees. 44, 48.
5. The Court finds and concludes that officer Beckett, having
the information set forth in paragraph 3 above, and the
authority granted in sec. 41-6-44(8), had ample probable cause
to place defendant under arrest for driving under the influence
of alcohol. In fact, she had probable cause without considering
defendant's statement. Layton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035,
(1987). Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757, 16 L Ed 2d 908, 86
S Ct 1826, (1966) .
Accordingly, defendant's motion to suppr^s evidence is denied.

Judge

